In 2007, expectations since the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004 have exceeded the capacity of the state to deliver. Economic indicators remained steady or improved slightly, but there was a growing sense of disappointment with Yudhoyono's presidency as well as signs of challenge to his tenure beyond the current term.
Introduction
It has been a common experience in post-colonial states that the high expectations that accompanied independence have not been matched by the state's capacity to deliver. This has usually produced disappointment and-to contain restive politics within a weak state environmentoften spawns authoritarian political responses.
1 It has been almost six decades since Indonesia achieved independence, but the relevance of this proposition remains. In 1998-99 Indonesia underwent a democratic revolution, which was taken a significant step further in 2004. The expectations that greeted this political change were great, but the state's capacity to deliver was limited. In particular, the election in 2004 of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia's sixth president was greeted with high expectations. But although he delivered some real, if at times modest, gains, by 2007 there was a growing sense of disappointment with his tenure. The problem was less with Yudhoyono's actual performance as president and more with the enormous task he faced.
Politics
Yudhoyono's presidency in some sense reflected conventional democratic processes. On the one hand, in 2007 he continued to oversee some cautious and somewhat limited policy reforms around corruption, financial governance, and the military. On the other hand, he was open to criticism for inaction or otherwise failing to deliver on electoral promises. This latter aspect reflects the role of the opposition in a plural political framework, a function taken up with some enthusiasm by the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), led by former President Megawati Sukarnoputri.
If the oppositional role of the PDI-P reflected a developing partisan duality in Indonesia, this in turn indicated increasing coherence around two broad, internally distinct political groupings, which is commonly taken as a sign of democratic political processes. This was not to suggest that a plethora of specific interests was no longer reflected in multiple political parties but that the role of government and opposition was becoming more developed and distinct.
More disturbingly though, following signs of internal tensions in 2006, Yudhoyono's alliance with Vice President Jusuf Kalla in 2007 became increasingly strained. The friction involved a range of issues, including Yudhoyono's taking increasing control over economic matters that had been delegated to Kalla and the president's not replacing economic ministers in the May Cabinet reshuffle as Kalla had wished.
2 This was important because Kalla was also chairman of Golkar, Indonesia's largest party, with 127 seats of the 550-seat Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council, DPR), the lower legislative house. Golkar had until then helped ensure the success of Yudhoyono's legislative program.
Importantly, while there have been some grumblings about civilian politics from retired members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Armed Forces of Indonesia, TNI), especially from officers harking back to the TNI's formerly active political role, nonetheless military support continues to subside for any sort of intervention in the political process. This is not to say that the military could not at some future point increase its political power but that overall such power continued to decline. The TNI might be fighting a rearguard action against reform, and some retired officers might balk at any changes limiting their access to unofficial sources of income, but their scope for reversing civilian ascendancy appears to be increasingly diminished.
Interestingly, Sutiyoso, Jakarta's governor for the past 10 years, declared himself a candidate for the 2009 presidential elections, inviting parties to join him (since he heads no party himself) and hinting that he had support from the military. Try Sutrisno, former military head, vice president under Suharto, and chairman of the Armed Forces Veterans Association, attended Sutiyoso's announcement, as did former President Abdurrahman Wahid, who is the head of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, along with several other Muslim clerics.
3 Yet, Wahid supports no one but himself as a presidential candidate, and silence has followed Sutiyoso's appeal for support.
Sutiyoso's presidential candidature followed a similar announcement in September 2007 by Megawati. 4 Her announcement was intended in part to build a base from which to challenge Yudhoyono in 2009 but also to halt increasing fragmentation of the PDI-P and the desertion of branches to newer parties. The fragmentation of the PDI-P followed its dramatic decline in support (from 33.7% in the 1999 election to 18.5% in 2004) and consequent reduced access to the spoils of office, although it remains the second largest party in the country. By May 2007, 53 new political parties had been registered, 5 although some were in fact renamed existing parties that had failed to meet the minimum 3% vote requirement to remain registered in their former guise. In addition, former military chief and presidential hopeful Wiranto launched a new party from which he was expected to stand in the 2009 presidential elections.
One policy issue that resurfaced in 2007 was Indonesia's plan to build a nuclear reactor, the first of four, near Mount Muria, 440 kilometers east of Jakarta, to help meet Java's expanding energy needs. The plan, first announced in 1996 by then-Research and Technology Minister B. J. Habibie, stalled amid safety fears given Java's unstable geology. The plan was relaunched in mid-2007 for completion in 2016 but was quickly pronounced as haram (forbidden) by the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama. 6 This was the first time a mainstream Islamic group had made such a pronouncement on nuclear power. Unlike the earlier plan, the new proposal appeared to have financial backing, although Indonesia's neighbors continued to worry about the safety aspect, especially given the prevailing winds that blow across Malaysia and Singapore, should there be an accident. Yet, Australia has been quietly supportive, wishing to sell its uranium to Indonesia.
The Economy
The government has been implementing various structural reforms, albeit slowly, and in 2007 there were signs that investment was picking up. Although economic growth in recent years has been relatively robust, it has failed to create sufficient employment to fully absorb growing numbers of entrants to the labor force, leading to a surging unemployment rate. In order to enhance its credit standing, the government must improve mid-to-long-term growth prospects by reinvigorating both foreign direct and private domestic investment. Jakarta's structural reforms are designed to enhance this growth potential within a more stable political climate. These reforms encompass alleviation of corruption, micro-structural reform of the economy, and improvement of the investment climate.
The outcome of these efforts to date has been mixed. Labor market reform has met with strong opposition and been postponed. On the other hand, there have been several tangible gains toward alleviation of corruption, tax and custom reform, rationalization of local regulations that were distorting business activities, and improvement of the general investment climate. On balance, growth in foreign direct investments in Indonesia suggested that foreign investors' perceptions of the investment climate has improved as a result of the reform efforts. The Indonesian economy continued to grow at around 6% during early 2007, reaching 6.3% for the second quarter and just ahead of inflation until the end of the year, when it slipped 0.1% under. 8 This rate, well in excess of the nation's 6. "The Decision of Religious Scholars: The Muria Nuclear Power Plant-Forbidden," trans. R. Tanter (from Arabic), Ͻ http://gc.nautilus.org/Nautilus/australia/re-framing-australia-indonesiasecurity/australia-indonesia-nuclear-dynamics/indonesia-nuclear-power/muria-fatwa-materials/ muria-fatwa-documents-english-translations/the-decision-of-religious-scholars-the-muria-nuclearpower-plant-forbidden Ͼ , accessed November 30, 2007.
7. Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR), "JCR Upgrades Indonesia to BB/BB ϩ (FC/LC); Outlook Positive," Tokyo, Ͻ http://www.jcr.co.jp/english/top_cont/rat_info04.php?no ϭ 07i45&PHPSESSID ϭ 893e1ad1c648e99cf9020b2d3b8dbfe1 Ͼ , September 6, 2007. 9 maintained the previous year's positive tilt of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). While exports were up, this economic growth in part reflected renewed investor confidence, 10 markedly absent since the collapse of the rupiah in 1997. This could be attributed to the passing of a new investment law in March 2007, replacing a law passed in the 1960s, which put domestic and foreign investors on the same legal footing. However, the passing of a further investment law in July 2007 limited some areas of foreign investment access, sending mixed signals to an otherwise increasingly interested investment community. Inflation stayed relatively steady at around 6.3% until October, with an increase in November although with an overall prediction staying true to the year's average 11 following a spike in the cost of rice and oil price rises, with Indonesia remaining a net oil importer.
12
Poverty remained relatively steady at just under 18% or more than 40 million people, although the poverty level was set at only 152,847 rupiah ($16.75) per month, well below the World Bank's benchmark of a dollar a day, which would have put around 80 million Indonesians below the poverty line. Similarly, the rupiah was slightly firmer at around 9,124 to the U.S. dollar, while Indonesia continued to reduce its external debt to GDP ratio, bringing it to 35%, down from 80% in 2000 and just under 40% at the end of 2006.
13 Official interest rates were also decreased by a percentage point during the year, to 9.75%. Non-performing loans, which had plagued the Indonesian economy following the Asian financial crisis, eased 0.5% to 8.3%.
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Rule of Law
Since the end of the authoritarian New Order era (1966-98), it has been widely acknowledged that the judiciary is the weakest of Indonesia's key institutions, both in terms of judicial training and, more important, corruption. That is, judicial outcomes have often been poorly adjudicated and subject to financial persuasion. Three high-profile cases exemplified Indonesia's judicial weaknesses The Indonesian government's attempts to bring Suharto to trial for corruption had collapsed on the grounds that Suharto's ill-health precluded a trial. Transparency International estimated that Suharto was the world's most corrupt political leader, having amassed a fortune of between $15 billion and $35 billion. Yet, a civil proceeding by the government to have just $420 million returned in an out-of-court settlement failed when Suharto's lawyers refused to accept the claim by the Attorney General's Office (AGO). 15 A further damages claim against Suharto of 10 billion rupiah ($1.07 million) by the AGO had also stalled. 16 Despite Suharto's having been charged with corruption and his lawyers negotiating with the government over the extent of repayment, the former president successfully sued Time magazine for defamation and was awarded one trillion rupiah (around $128 million) by Indonesia's Supreme Court. In 1999, Time had asserted that Suharto had shifted $15 billion to off-shore accounts 17 in response to which Suharto lodged a defamation suit. Despite the grounds for defamation being rejected, the Supreme Court decision overturned a decision by the Appeals Court in 2001 and Jakarta District Court in 2000, upholding the defamation claim. 18 The Supreme Court panel hearing the case included a former general who had served under Suharto.
In another troubling case, in August 2007 the AGO began a judicial review of a 2005 Supreme Court ruling acquitting the one suspect in the murder by poisoning of the high profile human rights activist and critic of the military, Munir Said Thalib. The unprecedented review was intended to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling that freed Garuda pilot Polycarpus Bidihari Priyanto, who had been sentenced to 14 years for Munir's death. The Supreme Court had ruled that Polycarpus had only committed an administrative violation, i.e., the use of a fake document as a part of the conspiracy to murder Munir, and sentenced him to two years for forgery (he was released under amnesty in December 2005). However, investigations that implicated the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) in Munir's murder, including Polycarpus's employment as a BIN agent, were not pursued. This despite evidence discovered by the judicial review that BIN Second Deputy Manunggal Maladi had ordered Munir's death. 19 BIN has consistently refused to cooperate with the investigation. On September 27, 2007, two more suspects in the case, former Garuda director Indra Setiawan and former Garuda secretary of security Rohainil Aini were charged with Munir's murder. However, investigations into links between the case and BIN continued to be thwarted by the agency.
Armed Forces Reform
While reform of the TNI continued to be one of Indonesia's top priorities in 2007, this process was overshadowed by the purchase of new military hardware from Russia. Meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Sydney in September, President Yudhoyono and Russia's President Vladimir Putin agreed to a $1.335 billion arms deal that would see Russia supply Indonesia with two Kilo-class advanced conventional submarines, 20 amphibious tanks, 22 passenger and attack helicopters, and six Sukhoi jet fighters. It was the first military hardware deal between Indonesia and Russia since the then-Soviet Union provided Indonesia with weapons under a deal agreed upon in 1960.
The move to buy Russian military hardware, based on a no-interest 15-year loan, was seen as a direct response to Indonesia's having been cut off from U.S. military hardware following arms bans from 1991 until 2006 in response to human rights violations in East Timor and Papua New Guinea. 20 The military deal paralleled a $5.5 billion oil and mining investment package, boosting Russian interest in Indonesia up from less than $700 million in 2006. 21 At the same time, details emerged about how two Indonesian submarines shadowed an Australian naval vessel off the coast of East Timor in 1999, bringing the two countries close to a full-scale military confrontation. 22 Despite continued rhetoric around military reform, and the liberalizing influence of TNI head Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto, reform continued at a slow pace in 2007, including the de-linking of the TNI from business activities, which had frustrated practical civilian control of the military. TNI spokesman Rear Marshal Sagom Tamboen confirmed that the TNI would hand over its businesses to the government but added that the government would be responsible for meeting the military's funding shortfall-which, however, it failed to do. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono rejected civilian jurisdiction over military personnel, including for civil crimes, thereby flouting international standards for military accountability. However, the shooting dead by Marines of four protesters over a land dispute at Pasuran, East Java, was a dark reminder of the military's former methods. More positively, the appointment of the army chief and former assistant to President Yudhoyono in a former military role, Djoko Santoso, as TNI head in November 2007 indicated the reform process would continue.
On security issues, the Islamist terrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) was believed to be continuing to function, but in a significantly weakened state following the capture of its leader, Zarkasi, since 2004 and its chief bombmaker, Abu Dujana, in June 2007. Regarding more natural threats, Indonesia continued to be prone to geological instability in 2007, with an earthquake occurring in March in West Sumatra that killed 70. More closely related to human activity was a devastating mudslide in East Java beginning in May, which destroyed four villages and left more than 11,000 homeless. The mudslide was thought to have been triggered by nearby drilling for natural gas by a company, Lapindo Brantas, owned by the family of Peoples' Welfare Minister Aburizal Bakrie, which was required to carry costs for the displacement estimated at around $200 million. 23 
Fragmentation
Following the internal turmoil that Indonesia experienced in the wake of the demise of the New Order, by 2007 a sense of unity had returned to the state. The 2001 regional autonomy legislation was functioning, if sometimes weakly, and Indonesia's separatist rebellions had all but ended. The 2005 peace agreement for Aceh continued to hold, although with shortcomings. In particular, the Indonesian government's Law of the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) failed to fulfill a number of aspects of the peace agreement, and the law's provisions were watered down in practice. Notable problems included the inadequate distribution of funds for the reintegration of former separatist guerrillas; rejection of the bid by GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Free Aceh Movement) to register as a political party; and localized attempts to intimidate former GAM members.
More positively, the December 2006 Aceh elections were successful, showing a strong pro-GAM vote.
24 By-elections in three sub-districts were also held successfully in 2007, if with some initial reluctance by former anti-separatist militia members to accept the pro-GAM results.
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At the other end of the archipelago, representatives of Papua's indigenous political organizations, including the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), held a leaders' meeting at a secret location in September and agreed to set up an umbrella body, the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL). 26 The coalition immediately called for negotiations with the Indonesian government over the future of Papua. Notably, while it put a referendum on Papua's future at the top of its list of demands, 27 the coalition appeared ready to negotiate for an alternative political arrangement within Indonesia, including more completely fulfilling the commitments of the 2001 special autonomy provisions.
Conclusion
In 2007, Indonesia continued on its slow and sometimes inconsistent road toward reform under the cautious liberal leadership of President Yudhoyono. The president came under increased criticism during the year for being slow to produce results on the one hand, and as part of Indonesia's internal political competition on the other. However, the country also posted steady if unspectacular economic improvements. The state appeared more, rather than less, cohesive. Most expressions of concern over Indonesia's slow development, often directed at the president, reflected less his direction or ability and much more the wider lack of bureaucratic capacity, coupled with an administratively complex and economically fragmented state and lingering problems of localized corruption.
In large part, it would be unrealistic to expect a state as large, unwieldy, and underdeveloped as Indonesia to develop quickly following the economic collapse of the late 1990s. On balance, 2007 made another relatively steady step on the sometimes unclear and often obstacle ridden path of economic development and political reform. If expectations were not always met, that probably reflected hard reality failing to match the sometimes unrealistic hopes held for it. Under such political pressure, the state continued its slow movement away from, rather than back toward, authoritarianism, a modest and overall positive indication for Indonesia's future.
